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THE OPPORTUNITIES OF MULTIPLE SOVEREIGN
CRISES. THE EUROPEAN MARKET PHOENIX.'
LUCA C.M. MELCHIONNA*
ABSTRACT
Sovereigns default cyclically. History shows that this is a common
path. With the restructuring process, sovereigns can regain access to
international market after little time has passed. The Euro and Greek
crises, the biggest to date in terms of default, showed various issues:
countries have an advantage when borrowing on the international
market because they reinforce their status and identity as sovereigns.
This is a missed opportunity to render political leaders accountable
for their wrong policy decisions. Accountability can be analyzed under
tort and business standards. In addition, creditors and other sover-
eigns lack the power to control irrational and inefficient decisions
adopted by the defaulter and this can be economically fatal for taxpay-
ers who are not subject to the jurisdiction of the defaulter.
The European Union ("EU"), as designed today, is politically weak
because member states are still leading in creating economic, financial
and cultural divisions, and instability among European citizens'
welfare.
This paper intends to show that an economic crisis involving a small
country, in economic terms, in turn shows the existence of other major
crises within the EU community. Therefore, all the crises must be
tackled to regenerate the European and global social fabric. In fact, a
cultural or legal change takes more time and cannot be solved only
with economic solutions.
Common problems like corruption, tax evasion, excessive public
spending, evolution of legal cardinal concepts like sovereignty, and a
lack of European identity have a profound meta-economic
implication.
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These are obstacles not only to a strong Union, but also to responsi-
ble global governance. For the EU institutions, this is a missed oppor-
tunity to reach a wise federation of states. As long as the EU is not
taking a sharp direction, other economic crises are always looming.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since October 2008, the European institutions (EU) and the gov-
ernments of the 27 member states have injected approximately C 2
trillion ($2.6 trillion) in the EU market to face the Euro/sovereign
bond/Greek crises.2 The main goal was to avoid the default of Greece
and to control the domino effect potentially involving the most in-
debted sovereign countries of the Eurozone area, which includes Italy,
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.'
According to history, a country's default is a common occurrence,
with 74 sovereign defaults happening between 1981 and 1990.4 History
also shows that defaults occurred in clusters of countries' and gener-
ally after a pronounced lending boom.6 In this regard, the sovereign
bond European crisis, notwithstanding different triggering events, fol-
2. Economic and Financial Affairs, EtuizoeiAN UNIoN, http://europa.eu/pol/emu/index
en.htm (last visited Mar. 2012).
3. Id.; See also Michael Sivy, Why Portugal May Be the Next Greece, TIMi BJSJNIss , Mar.
27, 2012, available at http://business.time.com/2012/03/27/why-portugal-may-be-the-next-greece/.
4. Economics Focus, Default Settings. Sovereign Defaults Do Not Typically Lead to Eco-
nomic Catastrophe. How Much Comfort Should that Give? Tm EcoNOMISr, Mar. 31, 2010,
available at http://www.economist.com/node/15814868?story-id=1581468.
5. Id. (That is why other countries like Greece, Italy , Ireland, Portugal, and Spain briefly
GIIPS, were involved)
6. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default 5 (IMF Working
Paper No. WP/08/238, 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08238.
pdf /.
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lowed the U.S. credit default swap, affecting the world economy.' EU
institutions, similarly to the Federal Reserve and the U.S. govern-
ment, intervened to avoid GIIPS' and Euro's default and to reassure
institutional and foreign investors about the financial strength of the
European economy.'
Sovereignties have an advantage when borrowing on the interna-
tional market over corporations. After defaulting, they can benefit
from a framework of mostly unwritten rules of restructuring and, after
a short time, they are "back in business" selling similar instruments.'
If, in the long run, sovereigns have an advantage, what are the risks
of sovereign bonds in the short-term? EU institutions and EU mem-
ber-states were facing the risks of losing: global credibility; standing
within the internal market; financial reputation; and global economic/
political rank.' 0 The worst possible scenario would be to lose the EU's
financial stability, diminish its lending reputation, and be forced to
depreciate the Euro, hurting the overall EU economic output. A de-
valuation of the Euro would have meant rendering the currency less
appealing to international markets and diminishing the borrowing ca-
pabilities (and the repayment strength) of the Euro zone economies."
European political leaders had to decide whether to bear the cost of
allowing Greece to default- one of the 27 member states and one of
the 17 Eurozone members- while assessing the risk to involve the GI-
IPS area or pay for its debts."
However, there were at least three certainties that backed the EU
institutions' financial support: (1) costs of default are difficult to as-
sess; (2) the EU is able to financially support a relatively small (in
financial terms) country like Greece, but unable to face and autono-
mously sustain, namely without the intervention of the IMF or World
7. Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation
Arising From the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis, in Pui Ni L NDING RiI Soi OR: Si(cuRiIZAlION
AiriR Tn MoRioAGF Mi i ioowN, 163, 170-178 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2009).
8. Don Melvin & Sarah DiLorenzo, Eurogroup Chief: Lenders, Greece Should Agree
Soon, AwonAli) PR~ss, Oct. 8, 2012. available at http://www.usnews.com/news/business/
articles/2012/10/08/eu-finance-chiefs-to-discuss-debt-crisis-greece.
9. Jochen Andritzky, Sovereign Default Risk Valuation, Implications of Debt Crisis and
Bond Restructuring (2006).
10. Michael Dooley, International Financial Architecture and Strategic Default: Can Finan-
cial Crises Be Less Painfud?, 53 CARNi (if-Rociii itR CON]. SIA lS ON Pu1i. PoiY 361-377
(2000); Borensztein supra note 6 at 3. (Economists accounted for the following costs associated
international sovereign default: reputational costs; international trade exclusion cost; cost to do-
mestic economy through the financial system; political cost).
I1. Jeremy J. Siegel, Devaluation - Last Option to Save the Euro, FINANCIAL Tmln s, May
22, 2012, available at http:I/www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8626a02e-a35d-1Iel-988e-00144feabdcO.html
#axzz29NWIXFII.
12. Id.
2012] 33
3
Melchionna: The Opportunities of Multiple Sovereign Crises; The European Mark
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2012
34 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW REVIEW
Bank, a crisis involving five countries;1 3 and finally, (3) the restructur-
ing process has become progressively more efficient because of the
intermediation of third parties and the willingness of the defaulting
country to quickly re-enter in the international market. 4
Economists and policy-makers thoroughly analyzed the causes of
the global financial crisis." Each one of them has an opinion of the
causes and remedies.16 Many agree that the Greek bond crisis trig-
gered the Euro crisis, which affected the GIIPS countries and the
banking system within the UE and the Eurozone.1 7
This paper intends to focus on two aspects: (1) the existence of
other, less resonant, triggering causes: legal, cultural, and socio-politi-
cal crises like excessive public expenditure, tax evasion and corrup-
tion; and (2) the fact that these other crises have a more complex
"adjusting" process and healing time, and this affects the success of
any solution that does not have an interdisciplinary approach.
Economic crises have more impact and media appeal on citizens,
investors, businesses, and taxpayers' welfare. In contrast, political, cul-
tural, or legal crises have less visibility, but are equally, if not more,
disruptive than economic ones and may ultimately take the form of
economic crises.' This is because political, cultural, and legal systems
have a more circumscribed area of geographical influence." The EU
institutions and member states, while looking for a political compro-
mise on a common fiscal policy, are unaware of the influence that such
a political body could exert globally.20
In short, policy decisions taken in countries like Greece or Portugal
have an effect within the whole Euro area, and European institutions
13. (The EMF has now $1 trillion at disposal - however the GIIPS combined nominal GDP
is approximately $4.188 trillion) Economic Outlook Database, INI'l MoNFIARY FuND http://
www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Apr. 2011).
14. Borensztein supra note 6.
15. Bill Marsh, It's All Connected: An Overview of the Euro Crisis, N.Y. TIM-s, Oct. 22,
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/10/23/sunday-review/an-overview-of-
the-euro-crisis.html; Adam Davidson, The Euro Crisis is Back from Vacation, N.Y. TIMi s, Aug.
28, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/magazine/7-story-lines-to-watch-in-the-
euro-crisis-this-fall.html? r=1 &pagewanted=all.
16. Sebastian Dullien, There is a Euro Crisis Solution - Use the European Stability Mecha-
nism, TilE Gt ARDIAN, July 21, 2012, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/
jul/3 I/fix-euro-crisis-european-stability-mechanism.
17. Jack Dullen, In Euro Crisis, Fingers Can Point in All Directions, N.Y. TIM.s, Aug. 24,
2012. available at http://www.nytimes.com/201 2/08/2 5/business/global/in-euro-crisis-plenty-of-
blame-to-go-around.html?pagewanted=all.
18. Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal Theory, 36 SUFFOLK U. L.
Riv. 631 (2003).
19. Id.
20. Harvey Morris, Europe Slips in World Influence Stakes, International Herald Tribunes,
N.Y. TIMi s, May 12, 2012, available at http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/europe-
slips-in-world-influence-stakes/.
[Vol. 35:31
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and policy-makers currently do not have the instruments to face and
tackle this reality. 2 1 From a strict legal perspective, an excessive
spending measure taken in one country could affect the taxpayers of
other jurisdictions with a violation of their sovereignty and the "no
taxation without representation" principle".2 2 Ultimately, taxpayers
and creditors affected by these often irrational state members' policy
measures do not have any concrete legal tools to defend their interests
because of the sovereign immunity doctrine.2 3
The lack of common policies has become unsustainable. 24 The con-
cept of sovereignty has lost traction and is evolving.25 The Euro crisis
shows the European jurisdictions suffer from a lack of controlling
power from in preventing and controlling dangerous political choices
adopted by other member states.26 The EU is facing the need to
reformulate the relationship with the member states because, at this
early stage, an assembly of sovereigns carries much more political in-
fluence. 27 Ultimately, the EU is the legitimate forum for policies af-
fecting European citizens.2 8
This paper intends to contribute to the discussion of the aftermath
of the global crisis affecting Europe, offering a multidisciplinary view
for the purpose of creating a methodological guideline. Its primary
objectives are to: (1) generate awareness about the existence of multi-
ple crises interacting with each other that have a cyclical and inevita-
ble recurrence; (2) to trigger discussion on multiple, but coordinated
levels about the importance of the interactions of the various crises;
and (3) ultimately draw possible methodological guidelines to develop
coordinated solutions.
This paper is divided in two parts. Part I presents the sequence of
events of the crisis in Europe with data support. After having exposed
the European legal framework, this paper illustrates the characteris-
tics of the European crises and the still vital opportunities of the bond
market.
21. The Euro Crisis: An Ever-Deeper Democratic Deficit, Tiii EcoNoMIsr, May 26, 2012,
available at http://www.econonist.com/node/21555927.
22. Paul D. Marquardt, Subsidiarity and Sovereignty in the European Union, 10 FoluIIAM
INI'si L. J. 616 (1994).
23. Jasper Finke, Sovereignty Immunity: Rule, Comity or Something Else?, 21 EuJR. J. INI'l.
L. 853 (2010).
24. lain Begg, Dermot Hodson & Imelda Maher, Economic Policy Coordination in the Eu-
ropean Union, 183 NAr'L INSI. EcON. Ri v. 66 (2003).
25. Eric Engle, Beyond Sovereignty? The State After the Failure of Sovereignty, 15 ILSA J.
I's & Come. L. 1 (2008).
26. Begg, supra note 24 at 67.
27. Engle, supra note 25 at 8.
28. The Policies of the European Union, EuRoi'iAN COMM'N. http://ec.europa.eu/policies/
index en.htm.
352012]
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Part 1I presents the opportunities and obstacles of the European
political and cultural crises. Excessive public spending, corruption,
and tax evasion will be considered as obstacles affecting the balance of
the European emerging market and GIIPS countries. A few legal con-
siderations will follow, among which are the political and economic
controls that sovereigns used to have.
II. PART I
A. Sequence of Events of the EU Crisis: the Data
The Greek crisis is the first in the history of the 10 year-old Euro,
and the largest in terms of debt when compared with other sovereign
debts.2 9
As a result of the 2008-2010 financial crisis in Europe, the total av-
erage Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the EU's 27 member states
fell from Euro 12.5 trillion ($16.25 trillion) in 2008 to Euro 11.79 tril-
lion ($15.327 trillion).o The Eurozone area, comprised of 17 out of
the 27 EU member states,3 I accounts for 76% of this total. 32 The
Greek GDP amounts to $309.231 (billion),33 accounting for 2% of the
EU area.3 4 In other words, the GDP of Greece has a small relevance,
at least on paper, to the overall economic output of the EU. Despite
this, that share had a more profound political, legal and cultural
impact.
In early 2010, Greece was close to defaulting because it was unable
to honor its bond obligation on the domestic and foreign market, and
29. Europe in Figures, Eurostat Yearbook 2011, EuriwwI AN UNION, 34 (2011). http://epp.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITYOFFPUB/KS-CD-11-001/EN/KS-CI)-11-001-EN.PDF.
30. Id.
31. Economic and Financial Affairs, EUnItovuAN CoMM'N,, http://ec.europa.eu/economy
finance/euro/index-en.htm (last visited Mar. 2012). (Members are Belgium (1999); Germany
(1999); Ireland (1999); Spain (1999); France (1999); Italy (1999); Luxemburg (1999); the Nether-
lands (1999); Austria (1999); Portugal (1999); Finland (1999); Greece (2001); Slovenia (2007);
Cyprus (2008); Malta (2008); Slovakia (2009); Estonia (2011)).
32. Id. at 34. (The 27 EU member states are: Austria (1995); Bulgaria (2007); Cyprus (2004):
Czech Republic (2004); Denmark (1973); Estonia (2004); Finland (1995); France (1952); Ger-
many (1952); Greece (1981); Hungary (2004); Ireland (1973); Italy (1952); Latvia (2004); Lithua-
nia (2004); Luxemburg (1952); Malta (2004); Netherlands (1952); Poland (2004); Portugal (1986);
Romania (2007); Slovakia (2004); Slovenia (2004); Spain (1986); Sweden (1995); United King-
dom (1973). Of these, 10 countries to do not participate to the Euro and they are: Bulgaria;
Czech Republic; Denmark: Hungary; Latvia; Lithuania; Poland; Romania; Sweden; United
Kingdom.) See also Countries, EuRoPI'AN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index
en.htm (last visited Mar. 2012); See also Convergence Report of the European Commission, Eu-
ROn AN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/eu/convergence-reports/index-en.htm
(last visited Mar. 2012).
33. World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011 5, INT' I MONIEI ARY Ft NI), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (last visited March
2012).
34. Domenico Lombardi, Is the Euro-Cure Worse than the Disease?, BiROOKINGs, Jan. 31,
2012, available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2012/02 euro cure lombardi.aspx'p=1.
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because over the last three decades35 it "produced" and amassed more
debt (comprising of interests) than revenue that it is still unable to pay
back.3 This economic outlook should be kept separate from the polit-
ical, legal, and cultural crises. From an economic perspective, the in-
ability of the Greek government to repay its bonds was connected to a
fiscal crisis, mainly (1) a high level of public debt and (2) a severe
budget deficit.3 7
The "public-" or "government-debt" is the debt owed by a country
or sovereign to banks, public or private institutions, or to its national
or foreign institutions or citizens.
To put the Greek number in context, between 2008 and 2009, the
government-debt ratio to GDP of the EU 27 area rose from 61.8% to
74.0%; within the Eurozone, comprised of 17 EU member states, from
69.8% to 79.2% in 2009/2010.39 In 2007 in Greece alone, the govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio was 105%; in 2008, 110.3%; in 2009,
126.8%.40 In May 2011, the government debt accounted for 142.76%
of Greece's GDP 41 because the debt amounted to Euro 327 billion
($470 billion) (Table 4), when the debt overcame the national econ-
omy (IMF data).4 2 There is a slight discrepancy with the OECD data
that does not change the substance of the economic situation (Table
1).43
35. July 23, 1974: Greek Military Rule Gives In To Democracy, BBC: ON Tiiis DAY, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/j uly/23/newsid 2515000/2515819.stm (last visited Mar.
2012) (namely after the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974).
36. Dody Tsiantar, Go Ahead and Default Greece!, CNN MoNI Y (May 18, 2010, 8:24 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/17/news/international/grecce-sovereign-default.fortune/; See also
Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Banks Bet Greece Defaults on Debt They Helped Hide, N.Y.
TIMi s. Feb. 24, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/business/global/25swaps.
html? r=0.
37. Rebecca M. Nelson, Paul Belkin, & Derek E. Mix, Cong. Research Serv., R41167,
Greece's Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications 3 (2011), available at http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41167.pdf.
38. U.S. Bureau of Public Debt: Who We Are, Department of Treasury, http://www.public
debt.tieas.gov/whoweaie/who we are.htm (last visited Mar. 2012) (In the U.S. the public debt
accounts for $15.5 trillion at March 20, 2012, which is 58.9% of the Gross Domestic Product).
39. Supra note 29 at 60.
40. Id. at 66.
41. World Economic Outlook, September 2011: Slowing Growth, Rising Risks, INI'l MoN-
I \iRy FuNo, 76 (2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/pdf/text.pdf
(last visited March 2012).
42. Michele Sinner & Dina Kyriakidou, Greece Denies May Quit Euro, Rtri IJRS (May
6, 2011, 9:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/07/us-greece-eurozone-exit-idUSTRE
74546320110507; See also Q&A: Greece's Financial Crisis Explained, CNN (Mar. 26, 2010, 11:01
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/02/10/greek.debt.qanda/index.html.
43. Aggregate National Accounts, OECD iLiBRARY (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.oecd-ih
bra!ry.org/economics/data/aggiregate-national-accounts/gross-domestic-product-data-00001 -en
7
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TABLE 1
EU Country Government-debt Ratio
Austria 71.6%
Belgium 98.5%
France 85.5%
Germany 81.8%
Italy 119.6%
Portugal 110%
Spain 66%
Romania 33.3%
Hungary 82.6%
Greece 142.8%
North America
United States 102%
Canada 83.5%
IMF 2010/201 1.44
The budget deficit is based on a yearly projection and is calculated
on the difference between government spending on goods and ser-
vices and the total current revenue based on taxes and transfer of pay-
ments.4 5 In other words, the imbalance is caused when the
government spends more money than it is capable of collecting or sim-
ply that it does not have and thus, has to borrow.46 The fiscal deficit
also includes the interest calculated on the debt.4 7 In 2010, Greece has
a budget deficit of -10.5% (it was -15.4% in 2009) of its economic
output (OECD Table 2).48
To put these numbers in context, the government deficit of the 27
member-states increased from 2.3% of the GDP in 2008 to 6.8% in
2009.49 In 2009, Ireland's deficit was at -14.4% (the worst in the EU);
44. Report for Selected Countries and Subjects, IN 1, MoNI ARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 2012) (click on "By
Countries;" Click on "Select Countries.") (However, the Eurostat numbers are not identical).
45. Ari Aisen & David Hauner, Budget Deficits and Interest Rates: A Fresh Perspective,
(IMF Working Paper No. WP/08/42 ,2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/
longres.aspxsk=21667.0.
46. Id.
47. Michael Burda & Charles Wyplosz, Macroeconomics: A European Text 56 (1995).
48. Euro Area and EU27 Government deficit at 6.0% and 6.4% of GDP Respectively, EuRo
SIAi Ni ws Ri iEAS! : EumROINDIwAORS (Apr. 26 2011), http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITYPUBLIC/2-26042011-AP/EN/2-26042011-AP-EN.PDF; See also supra note 43.
49. Supra note 29 at 60.
8
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the U.K. -11.4% and Spain -11.1%."o No EU member-states had a
surplus in 2009."i
From an economic perspective, as anticipated, Greece was unable
to repay its debt due to such factors as the impossibility of depreciat-
ing the Euro, high repayment interests, political instability, and un-
controlled public spending."2 This instability caused Greece's bonds to
plunge, sending the 10-year yield to 25%; high spread5 3 and down-
grades are signs of a possible default. 54 This occurs because investors
demand higher interests when the issuer - in this case a sovereign - is
not able to repay its debt. 5 The higher interests compensate for the
risk that the investor must bear to hold the sovereign notes.56  Simi-
larly, they drive up the borrowing costs of the sovereign, triggering a
default.5 Greece's financial condition benefited from the immediate
response of the European institutions, unlike the Argentina default in
2001."
History proves that sovereign crises are quite common." This time,
in order to avoid the spreading of the crisis to GIIPS, the EU and IMF
agreed to lend a first package of Euro 110 billion ($158 billion) in May
2010.60
On May 9, 2010, the Euro area member states ("Eurozone") cre-
ated the European Financial Stability Facility ("EFSF").6 1 The fund
50. Id. ("Deficit ratios were greater than the target reference value of -3 % of GDP in 21 of
the Member States in 2009, up from 11 Member States in 2008, while Hungary and Greece had a
government deficit exceeding the -3 % threshold for the whole of the reporting period 2006 to
2009. The largest government deficits (as a percentage of GDP) in 2009 were recorded by
Greece (-15.4 %), Ireland (-14.4 %), the United Kingdom (-11.4 %), Spain (-11.1 %), Latvia (-
10.2 %), Portugal (-9.3 %), Lithuania (-9.2 %) and Romania (-8.6 %).").
51. Id.
52. Nikos Tsafos, Ten Surprising Facts About Greek Economic History, GREE1K DirFAuMir
WAicii (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.greekdefaultwatch.com/2012/ 10/ten-surprising- facts -about-
gr-eek.html.
53. High-yield spreads are commonly used to determine the credit risk. A high-yield spread
means that the bond instrument cannot be repaid and the issuer is close to default.
54. Bianca De Paoli, Glenn Hoggarth & Victoria Saporta, Costs of Sovereign Default, Bank
of England: Quarterly Bulletin Q3 July 2006, at 297, available at http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/publicaitions/docunents/quarter lybulletin/qb0603.pdf.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Peter G. Dunne, Iransparency Proposal for the European Sovereign Bond Markets, 15
J. Fin. Reg. and Comp. 186 (2007) (subscription required for access).
58. Drew Benson, What Greece Can Learn From Argentina's Default, BiSINrSSWEEiK
(Mar. 12, 2012). http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-1 5/what-greece-can -learn-from-
argentinas-default.
59. Andritzky, supra note 9 at 15.
60. Greece, N.Y. Ti rws, Mar. 1 2012, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/countriesandterritories/greece/index.html.
61. Council of the European Union, Reg. 9606/2010, available at http://register.consilium.
europa.eu/pdf/en/10/stO9/st09606.enlO.pdf (last visited March 2012), See also About EFSF, Eu-
RoiLAN FINANCIAL SIAnAnrnny FUND, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm (last visited
March 2012).
2012] 39
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has a mandate to safeguard the financial stability of the Eurozone
area by providing financial assistance, in the form of a loan, only to its
members. 62 However, the EFSF works in conjunction with the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM)13 with a volume ceiling of Euro 500
billion (funded in part by the IMF)." To date, Euro 102 billion has
already been loaned to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. 65
On March 14, 2012, the EU formally approved a second bailout
package to finance Greece with Euro 130 billion ($169 billion) until
2014, with the authorization to release the first tranche of Euro 39.4
billion by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF).6 6
In addition to this measure, and in order to calm and reassure the
market, on March 20, 2012 the EU Consiliun, formed by the finance
ministers of the EU member states, agreed to set up a firewall of more
than Euro 800 billion. Such fund has the goal of creating a cushion
and control the financial stability of the Eurozone. 67 At this point, the
ESM and the EFSF have a combined lending capacity superior to the
IMF.6 8 The Eurozone countries also agreed to contribute an addi-
tional Euro 150 billion to the IMF.6 9
The sovereign crisis"0 and the announced risk of inability of other
Southern European countries to repay their debts, would have simply
put the EU monetary system and the Euro area under pressure with
the possibility of spreading negative waves to the global economy."
62. Council of the European Union, supra note 61; About EFSF, supra note 61.
63. Council of the European Union, supra note 61.
04. European Stabilisation Mechanism Adopted, (OJNCI ol on: EuRoIEAN UNION (Dec.
5, 2010), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepagc/showfocus?lang=en&focuslD=66189.
65. Id.
66. Financial Assistance to Greece, EuROPIlAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/economy
finance/assistance eu-ms/greekloan-facility/index-en.htm (last visited Apr. 2012); see also Jan
Strupczewski, New Greek Bailout May Total 120 Billion Euros - Sources, RI uoi;Iws (Jun. 9,
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/09/eurozone-greece-bailout-idUSLDE75819V2011
0609; See also Jan Strupczewski, Euro Zone Formally Approves 2nd Greek Bailout: Statement,
RiEurERs (Mar. 14. 2012),http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-eurozone-greece-idUS-
BRE82DOLK20120314. (The release of the tranches will be based on observance of quantitative
performance criteria and a positive evaluation of progress made with respect to policy criteria in
Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 (as amended in November 2011 and on 13 March
2012) and the Memorandum of Understanding setting the economic policy conditionality, which
was signed on 14 March).
67. James Kanter, Officials Reach Agreement on Euro Zone Bailout Fund, N.Y. Times, Mar.
30, 2012, at B6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/31/business/global/europe-agrees-
to-1-trillion-bailout-fund-for-euro.html'?_r=1&hp#; see also Eurozone Deal to Boost Firewall,
Eur. Union Consilium (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/homepage/highlights/
eurozone-deal-to-boost-firewall?lang=en.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Motivated by the fact that investors were facing the risk of collecting between 30 or
40% of their investment.
71. European Debt Crisis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 2012, available at http://topics.nytimcs.com/
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/e/european-sovereign-debt crisis/index.html.
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This is so because other banks, mainly within the Eurozone, hold sov-
ereign bonds of GIIPS and act as lenders, thus investors would risk
losing the interest and principal invested.
On October 26, 2011, the Greece sovereign crisis became unsustain-
able." When Italy and Spain- two big EU members which would have
multiplied the magnitude of the sovereign crisis and spread it to the
US, affecting its recovery- 74 showed signs of instability, the European
Council and Commission, along with the governments of Germany
and France, agreed on various new measures. These measures in-
cluded reducing Greece's public debt to 120% of its GDP by 2020."
The restricting process established the swap of the matured bonds and
a reduction to 53.5% of the original value, with a participation of
95.7% of all the eligible securities, and the first tranche of bonds swap
of Euro 20.3 billion to occur on April 11, 2012.76 In addition,
Eurozone member states must contribute up to Euro 30 billion ($39
billion) to the private sector involvement package.
Recently, in order to reduce the lack of transparency, the possibility
of arbitrage, and abuse of exploitation of the financial system with
negative price spirals, the European Council adopted a new regulation
on short-selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps (CDS).
The regulation introduces common EU transparency requirements
and harmonizes the powers that EU and state member regulators (the
European Security Markets Authority) may use when the European
financial stability is at risk.7 9
The new regulation introduces a regime of notification to regulators
of only significant net short positions in EU sovereign bonds. CDS
positions are included, relating to sovereign debt issuers.so Disclosure
72. Andritzky, supra note 9 at 1, 43.
73. Edward P. Lazear, Editorial, The Euro Crisis: Doubting the 'Domino' Effect, THi WALL
SImE Y JOuRNAL, Oct. 31, 2011, available at http://onlinc.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203
554104577003924075089102.html.
74. Id.
75. Way out of the Debt Crisis, EtIROPFAN CouNCii (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.european-
council.europa.eu/home-page/highlights/way-out-of-the-debt-cr isis?lang=en.
76. Marcus Bensasson, Greece to Swap Euro 20.3 Billion of Foreign Law Bonds on April II,
Bloomberg (April 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-05/greece-to-swap-20-3-
billion-euros-of-foreign-law-bonds-april-11 .html.
77. Ways out of the Debt Crisis, supra note 76.
78. Press Release, Council of European Union, Regulation Adopted on Short Selling and
Credit Default Swaps (Feb. 21, 2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms data/docs/piressdata/enlecofin/128081.pdf. See also Memorandum from
European Comm'n, Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps- Frequently Asked
Questions (Oct. 19, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleases
Action.do?reference=MFMO/1 1/713, (providing explanatory information regarding the adopted
regulation).
79. Memorandum from European Comnn, supra note 78 at 5.
80. Id. at 4.
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will help to control the market and prevent abusive behavior. The reg-
ulation states that the disclosure must be provided only to regulators
and not to the market in order to prevent negative market conse-
quences in terms of liquidity.s" Disclosure of derivatives is included.8 2
B. EU Legal Monetary and Economic Framework.
All of the financial measures that have been introduced to contain
and solve the sovereign crisis must be seen in the context of a broader
legal cooperation among member states of an international legal initi-
ative: the Treaty of Lisbon ("ToL") or Treaty of the Functioning of the
European Union ("TFEU").8 3
The first rule that triggered the EU intervention in the Euro and
Greek crises is Article 3a of the Treaty of Lisbon, establishing the duty
of the EU institutions and member-states to support the other mem-
ber-states through sincere cooperation and solidarity.84
Additionally, in order to maintain solid financial stability, the 1993
Maastricht Treaty set up the Euro and introduced the so called "Euro
convergence criteria" (also known as the Maastricht criteria). 5 Arti-
cle 140 of the TFEU (old article 121(1) of Treaty of the Economic
Community, EC Treaty) establishes that, in order to have access to the
European Union and the Eurozone and to continue to be a part of it,
member-states, or new applicants, must comply with the following
requirements:
(1) Member states must not have an inflation rate of 1.5% higher
than the average of the three best performing member states;
(2) The ratio between the government deficit and the GDP must not
exceed 3% at the end of the preceding fiscal year (exceptions can
be granted in certain circumstances); and the ratio between the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon],
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:
PDF; Consolidated Version of the treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9,
2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:FULL:EN:PDF.
84. Article 3a of the Treaty of Lisbon states:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in
full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The
Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfil-
ment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institu-
tions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's
objectives.
Treaty of Lisbon supra note 84, at 14.
85. Introducing the Euro: Convergence Criteria, EuROPA.u, http://europa.eu/legislation
summaries/other/125014_en.htm (last updated July 07, 2006).
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government debt and the GDP must not exceed 60% at the end
of the preceding fiscal year;
(3) The new European countries willing to join the EU must have
introduced an exchange rate mechanism that must have been in
force for the two years preceding of the accession (with no de-
preciation); and
(4) The nominal long-interest rate must not be 2% higher than the
average of the lowest inflation in the three best member states. 6
In addition to these provisions, in June 1997, the EU Council
adopted the Stability and Growth Pact which established various pol-
icy guidelines.17 Among them, member-states had to abide by the me-
dium-term budgetary objective of positions close to balance or in
surplus. Also, they have to take corrective budgetary action necessary
to fulfill the objectives of the convergence programs and correct any
excessive deficit. In addition, they will have to correct excessive deficit
as quickly as possible."
As seen, the ToL is the main hierarchical legal source for the EU
institutions. In particular, Articles 119 through 144 of the TFEU regu-
late the European Economic and Monetary Policy." Within the con-
text of the monetary and economic policy, and under the TFEU, the
European institutions adopted a series of numerous directives and
regulations that regulated the economic and monetary field.'o
The EU envisaged an introduction of the Euro as currency in three
stages." The first two have been completed.92 The third stage of the
monetary union establishes that the process of adopting a single cur-
rency is irreversible involving all the 27 member-states." The Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks
started their functioning within a common monetary policy.94
However, because of a lack of close coordination and supervision,
the European central banks were not able to prevent the spreading of
the crisis.'5 On November 24, 2010, the European Parliament and
86. Id.
87. Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth and Employment,
June 17, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=OJ:C:1997:236:FULL:EN:PDF.
88. Id. at 2.
89. TFEU supra note 83, at 96-111.
90. See 10.3 European Union Legislation in Force, EUR-Li x, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/
legis/latest/chapl030.htm (last visited March 2012).
91. One Currencv For One Europe: The Road to the Euro, Eiuoi AN ('M\I'N, 1,7 (2007),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance/publications/publication6730_en.pdf.
92. Protocol On the I ransition to the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union, July
29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/
11992M.html#008700001 1.
93. Id.
94. One Currency For One Europe, supra note 91, at 11.
95. European Debt Crisis supra note 71.
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Council passed Regulation (EU) 1093/2010, establishing European
Banking Authority (EBA). 96 The European System of Financial Su-
pervision (ESFS) now has four ramifications: (1) the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (Reg. 1092/2010);97 (2) the EBA; (3) the European
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pen-
sions Authority) (Reg. 1094/2010);98 and (4) the European Supervi-
sory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority)
(Reg.1095/2010). 99
On February 2, 2012, the 17 EU member-states participating in the
Eurozone signed a new treaty establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (EMS).100 The new treaty was generated by an EU Coun-
cil decision, 2011/199/EU, that amended Article 136 of the TFEU with
reference to a new stability mechanism for member-states.' This
96. In its preamble, the Regulation states:
(1) The financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 exposed important shortcomings in financial super-
vision, both in particular cases and in relation to the financial system as a whole. Nation-
ally based supervisory models have lagged behind financial globalisation and the
integrated and interconnected reality of European financial markets, in which many
financial institutions operate across borders. The crisis exposed shortcomings in the ar-
eas of cooperation, coordination, consistent application ol Union law and trust between
national supervisors.
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Amending
Decision No 716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 12
[hereinafter Regulation 1093/2010], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriScrv/LexUri
Serv.do'?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0012:0047:EN:pdf.
Moreover, (33) reads, "The crisis has proven that the current system of cooperation between
national authorities whose powers are limited to individual Member States is insufficient as re-
gards financial institutions that operate across borders." Id. at 16.
97. Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
November 2010 on European Union Macro-Prudential Oversight of the Financial System and
Establishing a European Systematic Risk Board, 2010 O.J. (L 331) 1 [hereinafter Regulation
1092/2010], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:
0001:0011 :EN:PDF.
98. Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occu-
pational Pensions Authority), Amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission
Decision 2009/79/EC, 2010 OJ. (L 331) 48 [hereinafter Regulation 1094/20101, available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:331:0048:0083:EN:pdf.
99. Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
November 2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Mar-
kets Authority), Amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission Decision
2009/77/EC, 2010 OJ. (L 331) 84 [hereinafter Regulation 1095/2010], available at http://www.
esma.europa.eu/system/files/Reg_716 2010_ESMA.pdf.
100. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.
european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.enl2.pdf.
101. The new article 136 of the TFEU states: "The Member States whose currency is the
euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stabil-
ity of the euro area as a whole. The granting of any required financial assistance under the
mechanism will be made subject to strict conditionality". European Council Decision of 25
March 2011 Amending Article 136 of the Treaty of Functioning of the European Union With
Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency is the Euro, Mar. 25, 2011,
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new, permanent crisis management mechanism is an intergovernmen-
tal body and has the duty to safeguard the financial stability of the 17
member-states. The ESM replaces all of the temporary solutions ex-
isting so far, like the Greek loan facility, the EFSM, and the EFSF by
July 1, 2013 or until all other claims have been satisfied. 0 2 The ESM is
comprised of a Board of Governors, Board of Directors, and a Man-
aging Director (Article 4).103 The Board of Governors is formed by
the Finance Ministers of the signatories.10 4 The Board must make de-
cisions with unanimity.'0 A decision will involve: (1) the granting of
financial assistance to a member, even in the form of precautionary
financial assistance; (2) the terms of the assistance; (3) the amount of
the financial support; and (4) a change in the instrument providing
financial support (Articles 14-18).16
The EBA, whose seat is in London, has several tasks: (1) contribute
to establishing high-quality common regulatory and supervisory stan-
dards and practices through the providing of opinions, recommenda-
tions, and draft regulations to the US institutions; (2) contribute to the
consistent application of Union law and, in particular, favoring a com-
mon supervisory culture preventing arbitrage, mediating disagree-
ments among central authorities, and insuring effective and consistent
supervision of financial institutions; (3) facilitate the delegation of
tasks among competent authorities; and (4) monitor and assess mar-
ket developments.' Briefly, the EBA is now responsible for deter-
mining policy in the banking sector that will be binding on central
banks.' It has supervisory authority on the central banks of the
member-states and it has responsibility for crisis management.'0o
The rationale is to have an institution that has a more effective su-
pervisory and implementation strength than the other EU institutions
in order to overcome the EU democratic deficit and the lack of a com-
mon fiscal policy.' However, despite the existence of a basic Euro-
2011 O.J. (L 91) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUiiSerV.do?uri=OJ:L:
2011:091:0001:0002:EN:PDF.
102. European Central Bank, The European Stability Mechanism, 2011 ECB MONTI ny BuII
L IIN 71, 74, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/art2_mb2OllO7en pp71-84en.pdf.
103. Id. at 75-76.
104. Id. at 76.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. About Us, EBA, http://www.eba.europa.eulAboutus.aspx (last visited March 2012).
108. Id. at http://www.eba.europa.eu/Aboutus/Legal-texts/Directives.aspx.
109. Matthew Elderfield, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and Alternate
Chairman of the European Banking Authority, Address to the 4th CDU/CSJ Congress in the
Bundestag, Berlin: European Banking Regulation and the Eurozone Crisis (Mar. 26, 2012) avail-
able at http://www.bis.org/review/rl20327f.pdf?frames=0.
110. Remi Colliat, A Critical Genealogy of European Macroeconomic Governance, 18 Euro-
pean L. J. 6, 6-23 (2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.111 1/j.1468-0386.
2011.00583.x/pdf; See also Brian Blackstone, Matthew Dalton, & Stephen Fidler, Tensions Rise
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pean regulation within the monetary and economic field that lacks
strong sanctions and effective implementing action, the market on the
issuance of international bonds and sovereign lending remains sub-
stantially unregulated."' But is there a need for regulation? Not
necessarily.
C. Three in One: the Euro Crisis, the Sovereign Bond Crisis, and
the Banking Crisis.
The Euro crisis represented the first global test for the 10-year-old
currency and the young political and economic infrastructure of the
EU. It was amplified due to the interaction with the banking and
Greek sovereign crises that triggered the intervention of the EU
institutions.
The Euro financial crisis showed the weaknesses of the EU financial
architecture, its monetary and financial governance, and, more impor-
tantly, its lack of a coordinated fiscal policy." Over time, the Stability
and Growth Pact fiscal rules and economic policy coordinating mea-
sures have not been implemented.' 1 3 Such lack of coordination, har-
monization, implementation, and supervision manifested its limits
during the crisis, dangerously showing the delay of the EU interven-
tion due to lack of instruments available to the EU institutions and
member-states." 4 The old critique of a weak coordination and lack of
a common fiscal policy revealed itself to be painfully true with the
Greek crisis."
Preliminarily, there is no consensus on the concept of default."'
Furthermore, a crisis can take different forms when triggered by vari-
ous causes." 7 Default can consist of debt gone into arrears or even
unpaid restructured debt."8 Creditors can be private investors as well
as public institutions.1 9
at EU Summer: Bid to Revise Treaty Fails to Win Full Support; Central Bank Spook Investors,
Tim WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 9, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SBi1000142
40529702035013045 77086030233783036.html?mod= WSJ Europe-hppLEFTlopStories.
111. Memorandum from Brussels on Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps-
Frequently Asked Questions (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release
MEMO-11-713 en.htm.
112. Alessandro Turrini, Fiscal Policy and the Cycle in the Euro Area: The Role of Govern-
ment Revenue and Expenditure, EriROPFAN EcON., May 2008 at 1, available at http://ec.europa.
eu/economy finance/publications/publication l2600 en.pdf.
113. See Infra at note 115.
114. See Infra at note 115.
115. Jordi Gali & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Policy and Monetary Integration in Europe 1
(NBER Working Paper No. 9773, 2003) , available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9773.
116. See Infra at note 119.
117. See Infra at note 119.
118. See Infra at note 119.
119. Enrica Detragiache & Antonio Spilimbergo, Crisis and Liquidity: Evidence and Inter-
pretation (IMF Working Paper No. WP/01/02, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
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The Greek sovereign risk of default affected its GDP because major
European banks and Greek pension funds were the creditors and they
threatened to stop providing liquidity and credit to the Greek, GIIPS,
and in turn, Eurozone economy.120 The risk of default caused Greece
to be unable to obtain additional credit from external sources.
Greece's critical fiscal situation, which failed to comply with the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact EU guidelines, revealed its inability to adopt
corrective actions.12 ' Not only did the Greek crisis reveal inaccuracies
in public finance management and budget projections, but overall, it
showed how an irresponsible appetite for profits from the private fi-
nancial works married perfectly with government's desire to acquire
capital, while avoiding public scrutiny and international
supervision. 122
If we look at Europe from 1824 to 2004, there are 46 episodes of
defaults; 32 in Eastern Europe and 14 in Western Europe. 12 3 Greece
alone defaulted in 1826, 1894, and 1932. Emerging economies have
similar records that have been widely recorded and analyzed.124 As a
result, a sovereign bond crisis appears to be a cyclical phenomenon for
emerging economies. The issue then is not to avoid its occurrence, but
handling the after-crisis with a strong and efficient restructuring
process.125
The three crises are separate but connected because the bonds were
held by Greek investors, in pension funds, or banks within the
Eurozone countries, such as Germany, Italy, and France,126 are linked
to an economy where the European institutions and the other mem-
pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp0102.pdf.; Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, & Miguel A. Savastano,
Debt Intolerance (NBER Working Paper No. 9908, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w9908.pdf?newwindow=1.; De Paoli, supra note 54 at 300, Glenn Hoggart, & Victoria
Saporta, Costs of Sovereign Default, 46 Quarterly Bulletin Bank of England 3 July 2006, at 300,
297-307, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/fsr/fs-paperO1.
pdf.
120. See Infra at note 124.
121. David S. Hoelscher & Marc Quintyn, Managing Systemic Banking Crises, IMF Occa-
sional Paper, Aug. 28, 2003, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspxsk=
16484.0.
122. Videotape: Frontline, Money, Power, and Wall Street (PBS.ORG video broadcast Apr.
24, 2012 and May 1, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/money-power-
wall-street/ (insight of the financial input).
123. Sovereign Defaults and Rating Transition Data, 2010 Update, Si \NDARn & Pooi1 (Feb.
23, 2011), http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/articles/en/us/?articleType=HTML&asset
ID=1245302231824.
124. Reinhart, supra note 119; Andrea Zazzarelli et al., Sovereign Default and Recovery
Rates, 1983-2006, Moody's Special Comment, 9-10 (2007), available at http://ksuweb.kennesaw.
edu/dtang/CRM/Moodys SovereignDefault.pdf.
125. Id.
I26. Landon Thomas Jr., Large Private Sector Investors Agree to a Swap of Greek Debt, N.Y.
TMI S, March 5, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/06/business/global/bankers-
group-agerees-to-gieek-debt-swap.html; Bouras infra note 132.
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ber states have little say. This is due to the European democratic defi-
cit and fiscal lack of coordination. 12 7
The domino effect threatened by the Greek fiscal and sovereign cri-
ses revealed the risk of the entire European banking sector defaulting,
as well as the emerging economies linked to it. 12 8
From a political perspective, the EU institutions did not allow a po-
litical postponement of the default moment, wished for by the Greek
political leaders, because the "default-point," at least from an eco-
nomic perspective, was already reached within the cluster of all south-
ern European countries, namely GIIPS.129 Like Citibank or J.P.
Morgan during the global financial crisis that originated with the real
estate bust in the U.S., EU institutions considered Spain and Italy
"too big to fail" as the entire European economic system was at risk of
being swept away due to their debts. 1 3 0 As a matter of fact, European
(in particular in German, Italian and French) banks holding Greek
bonds restricted the flow of liquidity and this caused the European
economic system to lose vitality and momentum."'
The "default-point" is the margin where a sovereign considers hon-
oring the sovereign debt no longer convenient when compared to the
advantages of a restructuring process. 13 2
From an economic perspective, a default represents an unwelcomed
event for investors. Even if analysts struggle to determine the cost of
default, investors always search for markets offering high returns be-
cause, with the purchase of sovereign bonds, they are betting on the
capabilities of young economies to satisfy their productive and effi-
cient allocation of resources.
From a legal perspective, a sovereign is the supreme authority of a
country to determine and assume legislative action, fiscal budgeting,
and economic policymaking.1 3 3 A sovereign is immune from bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and creditors lack contractual enforcement tools
due to political constraints because of the "sovereign immunity doc-
trine."-134 Even though this principle has been progressively narrowed
due to the fact that the issuance of bond is not a sovereign function
127. Colliat, supra note 111 at 1.
128. Stelios Bouras, Update: Greek Debt Swap Inches Forward; Deadline For Holdouts Ex-
tended, THE WALL ST iir JOURNAL, April 5, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/Bl-
CO-20120405-705016.html.
129. Sturzenegger, infra note 138, at 6.
130. Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail, The Hazard of Bank Bailout (2004);
Eric Dash, If It's Too Big to Fail, Is It Too Bog to Exist?, N.Y. TIMI s, June 20, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21dash.html?r= I &partner=rss&emcss.
131. Id.
132. Borenzstein, supra note 6 at 4.
133. Id. at 15. See also Sturzenegger, supra note 129 at 55.
134. Namely a state cannot be sued in another jurisdiction.
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but a commercial one, its original nature still persists."' Within Inter-
national law, the absolute immunity doctrine recently regained
momentum.13 6
Additionally, under international law, a sovereign is protected from
external influence due to the existence of the "non-intervention" prin-
ciple in national affairs.1 3 1 Other principles that a sovereign may in-
voke are "the act of state doctrine," that has been limited in Allied
Bank International v. Banco Creditor Agricola de Cartago'38 and Inter-
national Comity, as courtesy and reciprocity among sovereignties.'13
This protection, along with the certainty that a sovereign will not go
bankrupt,14 0 usually triggers issues of moral hazard as creditors may
have an indirect assurance that some supranational or intergovern-
mental entity will ultimately come to rescue.141 On the contrary, a cor-
poration lacks the status of a sovereign and cannot insure investors
with the same degree of certainty that it will remain alive and in busi-
ness so that other peer entities will come to its rescue and it will be
back in the same international financial market after a short period of
time. 142
However, the Euro crisis shows the limit of the sovereignty concept
under international law. With the unregulated issuance of sovereign
bonds, states, along with their private financial partners that provided
the financial tools, have the power to create systemic risks and other
member-states cannot control such economic/political freedom. The
welfare of the civil society, transnationalism, globalization, democrati-
zation, and the rule of law, worked as fundamental forces to limit the
complete political independency, in terms of indifference to the exis-
135. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA), 28 USC § 97 (1976); Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
136. Germany v. Italy with Greece intervening, International Court of Justice (2012) available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf (last visited April 2012).
137. Article 2 of the United Nation Charter, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapterl.shtml (last visited March 2012).
138. Allied Bank International v. Banco Creditor Agricola de Cartago, 566, F.Supp. 1440
(S.D. N.Y. 1983).
139. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex-
ico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418 (2nd Cir. 2005).
140. Namely it will not disappear as a legal, social and economic entity on the global map.
141. Timothy Lane & Steven Phillips, Moral Hazard: Does IMF Financing Encourage Impru-
dence by Borrowers and Lenders?, EuoNOMI( issmiis No. 28 (2002), available at http://www.
imf.org/exteinal/pubs/ft/issues/issues28/; Torbjarn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yungyong
Thaicharoen Bond Restructuring and Moral Ilaard: Are Collective Action Clauses Cosily? (IMF
WORKING PAP R WP/01/92, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.
aspx?sk= 15178.
142. Default is the inability of a sovereign to pay back its obligations taken with the issuance
of bonds. Debt obligations take the form of a contract (and often the law where the bonds are
issued). A contractual bond is composed of at least three basic features: covenants, remedies
and amendments. According to the applicable law, the regulation of each bond can change.
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tence of other sovereigns, within bigger political and economic macro
regional aggregates. 1 3
The intervention of the EU institutions in controlling the financial
shock created by GIIPS proves that member-states are losing their
normative fulcra and only bigger and more influential political aggre-
gations are capable of solving transnational issues. Member-states are
slowly becoming aware that the economic and legal welfare of their
citizens and limited jurisdiction may pass through the great good of
the European community.
D. The Opportunities of the Sovereign Bond Market.
History of default has an impact on lowering credit ratings, but not
in the long term.' After restructuring, emerging economies are able
to regain access to international credit quite quicklyl4 5
The overall effect of default is short lived and emerging markets in
default are able to reissue new bonds after two years, and, in certain
cases, after three and a half months.14 6 Provided that there is a seri-
ous effort to follow the restructuring plan as specified by the restruc-
turing institutions, 14 7 emerging markets represent an unlimited and
renewable source of profits.' 4 8 As far as bonds issued by private finan-
cial institutions, governments do not have an obligation to list them in
their financial documentation. 149 Taxpayers of a particular jurisdic-
tion are unaware of the debts of their government and will continue to
pay taxes for the repayment of these kinds of debts with their taxes,
until the legal system imposes some transparency or political
accountability.o50
Plainly stated, investors do not punish governments with a prior de-
fault history.15' This shows the close and unique link existing between
143. Benedict Kingsbury. Sovereignty and Inequality, 9 EuROVIAN JOURNAl 01 INTiRNA-
YIONAL LAw 599, 600 (1998). See also Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization ofJurisdiction, 151
U. PA. L. Ri v. 311 (2002).
144. Reinhart, supra note 119.
145. During the 1980's the average time was 4 years.
146. R. Gaston Gelos, Ratna Sahay & Guido Sandleris, Sovereign Borrowing by Developing
Countries: What Determines Market Access? (IMF Working Paper No. WP/04/221, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2003/lic/pdf/gg.pdf; Borenzstein, supra note 6.
147. Generally, the IMF, the World Bank, and the Club de Paris. See The Five Key Princi-
ples, CLUB DF PAIUs, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principes/cinq-grands-
principes (last visited March 2012).
148. If and when, due the lack of complete financial data on sovereignties, sovereign default
risk, sovereign restructuring, and recovery values are rightly assessed. Andritzky, supra note 9 at
5.
149. Id.
150. See infra.
151. Peter H. Lindert & Peter J. Morton, How Sovereign Debt Has Worked, Di vi LOPING
COuNIRY DvuI AND Tii WORLD 225-36 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989).
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creditors and debtors in this field. It is a "betting game" with some
possibility of default. Economists also showed that emerging markets
with well managed economies and banks with good balance sheets
have suffered no crises.' 12
Is the market of sovereign bond ultimately profitable for investors
and useful for emerging market sovereigns? Even if emerging markets
suffered from "sudden stops" and "capital flight" risks, from a histori-
cal perspective, they learned how to interact with foreign investors
and the international market in a more profitable and reassuring
way. 1 Today's emerging economies are able to return quickly on the
international market because they learned the way to manage imbal-
ances and control shocks with the use of the following recipe: (1) en-
hanced monetary reserves; (2) high growth prospect; and (3)
improved macro stability.154 There is a current pull of capital from
developed economies into the emerging economies when there are
signs of rebalancing and augmented reserve stocks."
This new pull of capital reveals the emerging market appreciation of
investors with no memory or interest in "betting" with a calculated
risk. Ultimately, after the 1970s, international investors are still at-
tracted by government bonds because, despite significant and partial
defaults, they are able to obtain significant returns over domestic in-
vestments, provided that a restructuring plan is readily introduced and
implemented. 151
152. Even though they suffer from slow growth, high interest rates, and currency deprecia-
tion, like Hong Kong, Singapore, and Argentina. Rudi Dornbush, A Primer on Emerging Market
Crises 7 (NBER Working Paper No. 8326, 2001), available at http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/
docelec/nber/w8326.pdf.
153. Alan M. Taylor, Professor of Economics, University of California, Davis, Global Fi-
nance After the Crisis, John Flemming Memorial Lecture at Bank of England (Oct. 12. 2010), in
QIUARTIEIy Bu LElI IN Q4 (2010) at 373.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 375; See also World Economic Outlook, April 2011, INI' MONIARY FuINo,
http://www.imf.org/exteinal/pubs/ft/weo/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf (last visited April 2012). For the
perspective from the investment bank, see Frontline, supra note 119 (insight of the financial
input).
156. Lindert, supra note 151 at 234.
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TABLE 2
1501 - 1800 1801 - 1900
Number of Number of Total
Country Defaults Years of default defaults Years of default defaults
1557, 1575, 1596, 1820, 1831, 1834.Spain 6 1607,1627,1647 7 1851, 1867, 1872, 13
1882
1558, 1624, 1648,
France 8 1661, 1701, 1715, n.a. 8
1770, 1788
Portugal 1 1560 5 1837, 1841, 1845, 61852, 1890
Germany 1807, 1812, 1813,(Westfalia, Hesse, 1 1683 5 1814, 1851 6
Sleswig-Holstein)
Austria n.a. n.a. 5 1802, 1805, 1811, 51816, 1868
Greece n.a. n.a. 4 1826,1843, 1860, 41893
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 2 1886, 1891 2
Holland n.a. n.a. 1 1814 1
Russia n.a. n.a. 1 1839 1
Total 16 30 46
157
157. Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, IMF Working
Paper (Oct. 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2008/wp08238.pdf.
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TABLE 3
Default or Restructuring Clusters - 1824 - 2004
Country 1824-1834 1867-1882 1890-1900 1911-1921 1931-1940 1976-1989 1998-2004
Austria 1868 1914
Bulgaria 1915 1932
Greece 1824 1893
Germany 1932
Hungary 1931
Italy 1940
Moldova 2002
Poland 1936 1981
Portugal 1834 1892
Romania 1915 1933 1981
Russia 1917 1998
Serbia . 1895 1933 1983
Yugoslavia
Spain 1831 1867, 1882
Turkey 1876 1915 1940 1978
Ukraine 2000
158
TABLE 415'
1o58uPT.ON PlcUS 2011
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158. Id.
159. Sovereign Defaults and Rating Transition Data, 2010 Update, Standard & Poor (Feb. 23,
2011), http://www.standardandPOOrS.COM/ratings/articles/en/us/?assetlD=1245302231824.
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III. PART 11
A. Obstacles and Opportunities. Political, Legal, and Cultural
Issues: Tax Evasion, Corruption and Excessive Public
Spending.
The aim of this paper is to generate awareness about the existence
of multiple crises interacting with each other that have a cyclical and
inevitable recurrence. At least within Southern Europe, economic cri-
ses do not come in isolation but interact at various levels with other
crises.160 The solution must be the result of a coordinated multilevel
effort.
Despite the fact that economic solutions are able to resolve eco-
nomic crises quickly, in the long run, political and cultural factors cre-
ate severe impairment and are able to put the same system that
recovered back at risk, as it will be showed shortly. The interactions of
the cultural, political and legal aspects with the economic and financial
crises determine the vitality of a particular jurisdiction and its interna-
tional competitive edge.
In other words, is there a cultural recipe capable of affecting the
economic or legal aspects of a crisis or recovery? Even though the
Eurozone reached a size that required the introduction and imple-
mentation of clear policies and managing rules, the majority of mem-
ber-states are still culturally focused within their geographical
boundaries. 1 6 1
The objective of this second part is to show that European citizens
still lack a deep sense of belonging to a bigger European community,
EU member-states did not surrender fundamental powers to the Eu-
ropean institutions, and the diversity and richness of European society
is still an obstacle to harmonization and integration.
In Part I of this paper, the Greek crisis was analyzed from an eco-
nomic perspective. However, the Greek and Euro crises were not a
simple problem of economic mismanagement, but a political misman-
agement due to a cultural factor intertwined within it.162 The political
features or pathologies existing in the leaderships of certain European
member-states have had certain detrimental effects.16 3 Member-states
160. See infra note 158.
161. Too Late for the Euro?, CoLUMBIA MAGAZINI 16 (Winter 2011-12).
162. See Takis S. Pappas, The Causes of the Greek Crisis are in Greek Politics,
01ENDI:MOCRACY (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/openeconomy/takis-s-
pappas/causes-of-greek-crisis-are-in-greek-politics (Explaining the history and development of
the Greek democracy after the dictatorship period, and the rise of the populism. patronage polit-
ics, and a culture of ethnocentrism hostile to the Europeanization).
163. Costantinos Koliopoulos, The Shape of the ESDP and the Transatlantic Link Conse-
quences for International Order, in INm RNAIoNAI ORI A IN A GLOiALIZED WoRiL 121, 126
(Yannis Stivactis ed., 2007).
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in Europe are different, thus, it is not only necessary to continue to
devise rules from EU institutions, but single states must develop spe-
cific rules to adjust to the need of the enlarged legal and economic
environment. The legislation of the single member-states is not an ex-
cuse to have them going adrift. Each member-state must be aware
that, as a member of a bigger community, it is capable of contributing
to the success, and failure, of the entire community as well as of other
European citizens.
Among the many issues, EU member-states still have great power
to negatively affect other states but bear small liabilities before EU
institutions. 1 64 EJC economic sanctions have little impact, and Euro-
pean citizens have not been given a sense of responsibility about the
political and cultural choices of their leaders. 165 Ultimately, political
leaders, as well as political parties, are able to create and adopt poli-
cies without sharing any liability, not even the liability to act as an
ordinary prudent person in protecting the interests of his or her
citizens.
Greece entered into Europe with a culture rooted in populism and
clientelism.16 6 Italy never abandoned the dominant business cultures
of nepotism, cronyism, and favoritism.'16  Spain deals with similar
iS~S168issues.16
In Greece, the "political" causes of the crisis are due to the manipu-
lation of the state and its resources, corruption, tax evasion, uncon-
trolled public spending, and the backing of the state by a strong
patronage politics.'16
164. Paul Craig and Grainne de li3rca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Material 31 (2011).
165. Id.
166. Sappho Xenakis and Leonidas K. Cheliotis, The Politics of Crime and the Financial
Crisis in Greece, ON rNfDniMOCRA(y (Aug. 2, 2012), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/
sappho-xenakis-leonidas-kcheliotis/politics-of-crime-and-financial-crisis-in-greece; Anthony
Barnett and Mary Kaldor, Can Greece Lead the Way?, OPvINDI roMURA(y (November 9, 2009),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/anthony-barnett-mary-kaldor/can-greece-lead-way; Pappas,
supra note 159.
167. Max Fisher, If Italian Corruption Were Its Own, Country, It Would Be The World's 76th
Largest Economy, Tun WAsMINGoroN Posr (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/18/if-italian-coriuption-weie-its-own-country-it-would-
be-the-worlds-76th-laigest-economy/; Anthony Faiola, Amid Crisis, Italy Confront a Culture of
Tax Evasion, Tiii WASImHNOION PosI (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/amid-crisis-italy-confronts-a-culture-of-tax-evasion/2011/11/22/glQAcf4JtN-story.
html.
168. Giles Tremlett, Spain's Savings Banks' Culture of Greed, Cronysn and Political Med-
dling, TI GuARDIAN (June 8, 2012), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/08/
spain-savings-banks-corruption.
169. Pappas, supra note 159. (Namely the state was providing jobs and social benefits prima-
rily to members or acquaintances of the PASOK party, that remained at the helm of Greece
during the 80's, part of the 90's and the first part of 2000); See also Sappho Xenakis & Leonidas
K. Cheliotis, The Politics of Crime and the Financial Crisis in Greece, OPENDEMOCRACY
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/sappho-xenakis-leonidas-kcheliotis/politics-of-
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The leader of the PASOK party, Papandreou, promoted the expan-
sion of Greece through the manipulation of the state resources and
with an insufficient tax basis able to fund such expansion.' 70 In addi-
tion, political leaders used the fear of new waves of immigrants and
the lack of power of European institutions as negative aspects to instill
an ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic sentiment in the population."'
This happened in Italy as well.17 2 Papandreou abandoned fiscal disci-
pline and introduced pay raises to public employees, an unprece-
dented increase in employment in the public sector, universal health
care, pension and other social security benefits. 7 3
Taxation was not sufficient to cover the expenses and the recourse
to foreign borrowing was necessary.174 The Greek tax base remained
small when compared to other European member states, and tax eva-
sion was endemic. 17  In November 2011, the European Commission
estimated Euro 60 billion of unpaid taxes, half of which are presently
being debated before a court of justice. The average length of time to
litigate a case before the trial civil court is two to four years.' 7 6 One
third of the Greek GDP is lost due to tax evasion, 177 and there are
doubts that the country is able to amend itself from the crisis, clear
evidence that the cultural component of the financial crisis is
crime-and-financial-crisis-in-greece; See also Anthony Barnett & Mary Kaldor, Can Greece Lead
the Way?, OPENDEMOCRACY (Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.opendemocracy.net/anthony-
barnett-mary- kaldor/can-greece-lead -way.
170. Xenakis, supra note 166; See also Takis Pappas, The Extinctions of the Greek Dino-
saurs?, OPENDEMOCRACY (May 11, 2012), http://www.opendemocracy.net/takis-s-pappas/
extinction-of-greek-dinosaurs; See also Pappas, supra note 159.
171. Xenakis, supra note 166; See also Pappas, supra note 167. ; See also Pappas, supra note
159.
172. BARBARA FAEDDA, EMozioNI 1 PAuRiu. COMI LA PoriTICA U I1IZZA 'AirAo, IN
Poi rITCA iD EMoZIONI Nil.IA SIORIA o'ITALIA DAI 1948 AD Or(I 101 (Penelope Morris et al.,
eds., Viella, Roma: 2012).
173. Pappas, supra note 159.
174. Id.
175. See infra note 185.
176. Dimrris EMVAIoMI:NOs & CiHRisios GRAMArmIS, QuEsTIONNAIRE ON Gw I (,
FuNDiNo, CisTs, AND PRomORTIONAI frY IN Civir Ju si icr Sys. (Univ. Of Oxford Mar. 6, 2009),
available at http://www.google.com/urlsa=t&rct=J&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=12&v
ed=OCCOQFjABOAo&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.csls.ox.ac.uk%2Fdocuments%2FOREE( E
.doc&ei=-XeAT-rOOafZOQHxz8zlBw&usg=AFQjCNH4N51xULdlxzcZ24kXlPjZhhaNmA&sig
2=xzyikkqZwZ8WlyuscVhuLA.
177. James Surowiecki, Dodge Mania, Ni w YORKi R (July 11, 2011), http://www.newyorker.
com/talk/financial/2011/07/11/11071 Ita talk surowiecki.
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profound.17  Tax enforcement is causing a deep friction and fracture
of the social fabric. 179
Political leaders in Greece, Spain, and Italy always preferred the
political clientele and the certainty of remaining in charge, rather than
introduce strict fiscal discipline. For some governments, there was not
even a dilemma in this sense.'so In Italy for example, over the last 20
years, political parties of every color reinforced a culture based on
fear of immigrants, xenophobic sentiments, idolatry of hedonism, and
indifference, if not reward, for poor ethical behavior.'"' A soaring
debt, the abuse of public money for personal and political interests,
endemic tax evasion, widespread corruption, and indifference for the
public good have been instilled in the cultural fabric of Italians as win-
ning cultural features of a new Italian lifestyle.182 Unfortunately, they
have simply replaced the values that the European Union had put on
the paper but never implemented.8 3
Political patronage has always been a common feature of countries
like Greece, Spain, and Italy.' 8 4 In Greece, political constituents
looked for favors, jobs, and money from their political representa-
tives, and for them, doing a favor was the guarantee of certain re-
election.' Political patronage was evident in Italy: the Parliament has
been often used to introduce ad hoc legislation to favor candidates,
178. Dimitri Bellas et al, IMF WORKING PAPER, WP/10/281, DETERMINANTS OF
EMERGING MKTS. SOVEREIGN BOND SPREADS: FUNDAMENTAL VS FIN. STRESS
(2010).
179. Jabeen Bhatti et. al., Tax Evaders in Greece, Spain and Italy Better Beware, USA TO-
DAY (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-29/tax-evaders-greece-
spain-italy/52822942/1.
180. Pappas, supra note 159.
181. Silvio Berlusconi News, TIMES TOPICS, N.Y. Timis (Feb. 12, 2011), http://topics.
nytimes.com/top/reference/tinestopics/people/b/silvio berlusconi/index.html?scp=2&sq=italy%
20europe%20berlusconi&st=cse#.
182. Le Finanze Allegre della Lega, L'Esizi.sso (Apr. 6, 2012), http://espresso.repubblica.it/
dettaglio/le-finanze-allegre-della-lega/2178070.
183. Id.
184. Rachel Donadio, Corruption Is Seen as a Drain on Italy's South, EUROPE, N.Y. TimIs
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/europe/in-italy-calabria-is-drained-by-
corruption.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; See Corrado Zunino, Rise del Terremoto all'Acquila, ora
racconta "lo Dissanguato dale Tangenti per il Palazzo", LA Ri vunni.IUA, (Oct. 20, 2012), http://
www.repubblica.it/politica/2012/10/20/news/piscicelli politici aquila-44898892/?ref=HRECI-3
(To understand the deep level of corruption re-characterized as business in Italy with interviews
to politicians and entrepreneurs currently in jail); See J. A. Pin Rivnis, THE Po oI1 O nIoI
Si loRA (Chi. Press, 1961) (For an academic view); See also EDwARD MAI FAKIS, Titt Pot.rrI-
CAL AND Socio-FCoNoMIC CoNToURs oF Souin uRN EUROPI:AN HisroRY, IN Tii Potiorius
AND Di moIIRAT CONSOI it)rION: SOuTt RN EU Ror IN CoMPARATIVE Pi ls'i ( Inv i (R.
Gunther et al. eds., Hopkins Univ. Press 1995); See also HANs DAAIn1)1 R, PAR' Ii s, EIrrr S AND
Poui IlAL Di vi I oiNi N S IN WI sniRN Euiovi', IN POtITICAL PARI 1S AND POLIFICAL Di-
viLOPM! NI (J. La Palombara & M. Weiner eds., Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).
185. Julia Amalia Hayer, Corruption Continues Virtually Unchecked in Greece, Di:R SPIIti 1,
(Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/corruption-continues-virtually-un
checked-in-greece-a-861327.html.
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corporations, associations, political parties, or political leaders.' Ital-
ian politics produces 700,000 people that make their living off of the
patronage system.18 7 In Spain, cronyism and nepotism are widespread
at national and local levels."88 Fifteen million Italians reported no tax-
able income in 2011, but three million of them own at least three
homes. 1 89 Italian taxpayers reporting incomes of less than $26,000
owned 188,000 Ferraris and Lamborghinis, more than 500 private air-
planes, and about 42,000 yachts.o90 In Italy, public money has been
widely used for personal purposes, from paying the education of polit-
ical leaders' children, to satisfying their sexual entertainment. 9'
Italians viewed this new trend as an ideal model because, in their
view, the creation of a debt today is not their problem but simply one
to be solved by future generations.19 2
Excessive public spending has been recently documented by the
2008 Audit European Parliament Report even within the European
Union with the fraudulent practice of hiring family members. 93
Corruption is not only more documented and well rooted in all
Southern and Eastern European countries, but it is also a costly
phenomenon.194
In Greece, Transparency International created a menu with the
prices of corruptible services: 195
186. Donatella Della Porta & Alberto Vannucci, Coinuvei ExclIANG s, Auios, Ri-
SOURCES, AND M IIANISM 01 PollfltCAL CORRU'lON (N.Y., Aldine De Gruyter 1999).
187. Sergio Rizzo & Gian Antonio Stella, LA CASrFA: Cosi I NIT1 riAnt IANI SONo
DiVINiAi INIO(CAnl! I (Milano, Italy: Rizzoli 2007); Miriam A. Golden, Electoral Connections:
The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy, and Legislation in Postwar
Italy, 33 BRI. J. 01 Poi.. Su. 2, 189-212 (2003).
188. Maelbeek Valley, Communication, Corruption, Nepotism and Politics (June 25, 2011),
http://josepsolano.wordpress.com/2011/06/25/ communication-corruption-nepotism-and-politics/.
189. Sergio Rizzo & Gian Antonio Stella, LA CASTA: COSI I POLITICI ITALIANI
SONO DIVENTATI INTOCCABILI. (Milano, Italy: Rizzoli 2007).
190. Valentina Conte, Quindici Milioni Dichiarano Zero Scatteranno i Controlli Sui Conti,
LA RimUanl ICA (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.ircpubblica.it/economia/2011/12/19/news/fisco
caccia evasori-26847517/.
191. Adriano Botta, Papi Girls, La Rabbia di Terry, L'ESPRI sSO (Aug. 3, 2010), http://
espresso.repubblica.it/dettaglio/papi-girls-la-rabbia-di-terry/2131831; See also Rachel Donadio,
Bossi Quits as Head of the Italian Northern League, EUROPE, N.Y. TiMi s (Apr. 5, 2012), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/world/europe/bossi-quits-as-head-of-italys-northern-league.html?
r=1&scp=1&sq=italy%20europe%20berlusconi&st=cse.
192. BANK OF INT'I. Siurnii Mi NTS, BIS PAPiiR No.65, TiIREAl OF) FISCAl DoMINAN(T?
(May 1, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=2078895.
193. INT- wNxi Auinr Ri-PoR i No. 06/02 1o ni EP INST., Auni OF Iltu PARLIAMI N FARY
AssisIANcI Ai.t OWANCi (Jan, 9, 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
publications/2006/0002/EP-PEADT(2006)0002_EN.pdf; See also Justin Stares, British MEPs
Forced to Stop Employing Family Members because of Fraud, MAtLONLINE (May 21, 2008),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1020987/British-MEPs-forced-stop-employing-family-
members-fraud.html.
194. See infra note 206.
195. Transparency International, Greece: The Cost of a Bribe (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/greece-the-cost-of-a-bribe.
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Source: Transparency International (2012)
In the ranking of 183 countries prepared by Transparency Interna-
tional on the basis of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), where 1
is the worst, 1.0 is the best:
Greece has been ranked 80th with a CPI of 3.4 out of 10 (sharing
the place with Colombia, El Salvador, Morocco, Peru, and
Thailand);
Italy holds 69th place with a CP I of 3.9/10 (sharing the place with
Ghana, Macedonia, and Samoa);
Portugal is at 32nd place with CPI of 6.1/10;
Spain ranks 31st with a CPI of 6.2/10 (between Cyprus and
Botswana). 19
In 2009, the cost of corruption in Italy was Euro 25,000 per per-
son.'9 The Italian Parliament started the political discussion of an
anti-corruption bill in 2010.'9' It is currently blocked in the Senate.l
The Department of Interior prepared a report of the state of the inter-
nal corruption that shows that the level of corruption within the ad-
196. Transparency Int'l, GinesL ConnUPOwN Ri tour 2009. Co0RRUPnON AND fil Pav-
vaH Si (roiz (Dieter Zinnbauer et al., eds., C'ambridge Univ. Press 2009), available at http://
www.tra nspairenicy.org/whatwedo/pub/global-corr uption-report_2009.
197. Giuseppe d'Avanzo, La Corruzione Costa 2ila Euro a Testa Ma in Italia Non & UIn
Reato Grave, LA Ri vuini WA (Nov. 18, 2009), hittp://www.r-epubblica.it./2009/11I/sezioni/political
giustizia1-17/corruzione-costi/corruzionie-costi.htmi.
198. See infra note 210.
199. I.ana Miella, 11 Muro Invalicabile del PdL, contro la Legge Anticorruzione, LA Rl ensl
B1 WA (Mar. 7, 20121), http://www.r-epubb)Ilica.it/politica/2012/03/07/news/il--murio-invalicabile-
del i.pdl-contr-o- la1egge-anticorrFuzionie-31152035/.
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ministrative and executive power is not only the norm but also
favored.2 00 Corruption is out of control in Spain as well.20 1
The results of exaggerated spending have become pieces of modern
architectural art ("ruins of super-modernity generated by the enthusi-
astic liberalism" 2 0 2) via an artistic observatory created and located in
Italy. Working as a cultural center rather than a watchdog, the obser-
vatory counts approximately 400 public buildings ("cathedrals in the
desert") started and unfinished with documented collusions between
the state, political parties, and criminal organizations.2 03
B. Legal Considerations
The cultural aspect of an economic crisis has a profound impact. It
is certainly true that an understanding of the legal and cultural aspects
of a society facilitates the resolution of a particular economic crisis.2 0 4
However, a shift in the cultural or legal fabric of a community takes
time, and the law itself is not a sufficient correcting tool because the
law adapts to the change of the society at a slower pace. An economic
crisis cannot be simply solved with economic tools. There is the need
of a coordinating effort with the awareness of the different healing
time of each issue.
There are at least two levels of interactions of legal issues: suprana-
tional and domestic.
The supranational legal issue: the European Union is still politically
weak. Rather than being a supranational or intergovernmental entity,
the EU should transform itself into a federation of European states.
The new EU Regulation on short-selling is the first step in reducing
the overreaching power of member-state sovereignties. More impor-
tantly, the EU institutions should be able to implement the provisions
of the ToL and instill a sense of responsibility and belonging in the
citizens of Europe. Member-states must transparently communicate
their investment plans and their spending policy to the EU institutions
in order to obtain, not only their prior approval, but also to share
responsibility. Finally, there should be discussion to think about the
200. MINISTERO DELLA GIusTIlzi: PRt lORSI lIARI P(ncISI, UN Tua( mirrio, RAP-
PORTO GRECO VALUTAZIONE ITALIA-2009, GR!ico EVA! 1/11 REiP (2008) 2E PRIMA I
SI CONDA SERI[ DI VAlUIAZIONI CONGIlUNTA RAmPolvia DI VAUIAZION! s; I IrA! A A)O-
T \0 DAL GRECO Al LA sUA 430 RImNIONI. PIENARIA (June 29-July 3, 2009), (July 2, 2009),
http://www.giustizia.it/giustizia/
201. Charlemagne, Why Spain is so Corrupt?, EoNOMISI (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.
economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2009/03/why-is-spain-so-corrupt.
202. Translation by the author of a portion of the presentation of the "Incompiuto Siciliano"
w ebsite, available at http://www.incompiutosiciliano.org/incompiuto-siciliano.
203. Incompiuto Siciliano, Osservatorio Partecipato sul Fenomeno delle Opere Incompiute,
http://www.incompiutosiciliano.org/opere/elenco (last visited Apr. 2012).
204. See discussion infra p. 30.
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possibility to consider European, as well national, political leaders ac-
countable for their operations within domestic and European court
systems.
In addition, the lack of implementing European rules adopted by
the EU institutions, (e.g., Commission, Council and Parliament),
should trigger not only economic sanctions but the risk of being ex-
cluded from the Union. If there is no sense of belonging in the citizens
(the base), an economic union has a limited duration.
At the member-states' level, there is still little awareness that the
GIIPS crisis had an impact on other European jurisdictions, as well
citizens' welfare.20 European citizens are unaware that bad policy de-
cisions adopted in a remote corner of Europe have economic and fi-
nancial consequences on the entire Union.2 0 6 And if used the wrong
way, such awareness can exacerbate divisions, inequalities, and ultra-
nationalistic approaches.
This is a symptom of lack of social cohesion and identification with
a bigger and wider European cultural dimension.2 0 7 Member states
still refuse to give their and other European citizens a sense of equal-
ity and commonality.2 0 8 There still is a fundamental lack of socio-eco-
nomic security and aspirations for Europe, as well as bonds and
bridges and moral values as cultural foundations.2 0 9
In this regard, at the supranational level, what is the role of the law?
When issuing international bonds, European member-states or Euro-
pean emerging markets have been more sensitive to unwritten inter-
national sanctions like the risks of losing global credibility, standing
within the internal EU market, financial reputation, and global eco-
nomic/political rank.2 1 0 However, there is more. Within the suprana-
tional legal environment, countries and EU member-states have
created rules favoring the rapid restructuring process of countries in
default.2 1 1 Certainly these are signs of the weakening of the Westpha-
205. See discussion supra Part 1.
206. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
209. Till Ams-rIRDAM Pox Iss, ExiouRINo THII C(LeURAL (HALLENGLS TO) SOCIAL Di-
MO(RACY. ANTI-IMMImRA I ION PoPI IL[SM, 1onNTI Y, AND COMMUNITY IN TIE AGE OF INSC I
iuTy 5 (Michael McTernan, ed., 2011).
210. Economists accounted for the following costs associated international sovereign default:
reputational costs; international trade exclusion cost; cost to domestic economy through the fi-
nancial system; political cost. Michael Dooley, supra note 10 at 362, 361-377; See also
Borensztein, supra note 6 at 3.
211. See generally Dimitri Papadimitriou, The Achille's Heal of the Eurozone, LA TIMIs
(Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://articles.latimes.com/201 1/nov/02/opinion/la-oe-papadimitriou-
eurozone-20111102.
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lian concept of state. Private entities cannot count on such a safety
net.2 12
The domestic legal issue: The international borrowing of govern-
ment works even without a strict framework of rules because coun-
tries, and emerging markets in particular, want to remain able to
borrow in the future. The key issue is to have a restructuring proce-
dure that is rapid and efficient. In this respect, the creation of a set of
rules guaranteeing a rapid solution of the economic crisis could be a
real advantage. But government officials are not responsible for moral
hazard behaviors.2 1 3 They may be nominally liable before the interna-
tional market, but internally do not currently suffer of any legal, cul-
tural or economic consequence. Is there the possibility at least to
apply the business judgment rule to political decisions that affect the
lives of hundreds of thousands of taxpayers? These and similar issues
need to be explored thoroughly.
Ultimately, an international set of rules for quick restructuring
works as an anti-competition tool for keeping non-efficient countries,
borrowing at the expense of foreign investors and generating un-
wanted risks for foreign banks (and for regional economic aggregates
like the EU), afloat in the international market. The restructuring pro-
cess works as an oligopoly cartel: as long as the cultural, legal and
political crises are not solved, there will always be economic cyclical
crises. The introduction of new values and new cultural trends take
time: decades if not generations. And the concept of sovereignty must
be redefined. A common market calls for appropriate legal instru-
ments, and these tools are still in the process of being built.
IV. CONCLUSION
Is the concept of sovereignty the new phoenix? According to my-
thology, the golden bird has a lifecycle of 500 years. At the end of its
life, it builds a nest with twigs on top of a palm tree surrounded by
odoriferous elements like myrrh, cinnamon, and spikenard. It burns,
dies, and rebirths. 2 14 A new golden bird (and a new state) emerges
with the same characteristics. 2 15 The Westphalian concept of sover-
eignty will celebrate 500 years in 2148 A.D.2 16
212. Borensztein, supra note 6, at 3: Dooley, supra note 10, at 369; DePaoli, infra note 241
and accompanying text, at 297.
213. Jeff Frankels, Could Eurobonds Help Solve the Euro Crisis?, i ii FRANKI 1,s Wi i ns
(June 19, 2012), http://content.ksg.harvard.edu/blog/jeff frankels weblog/2012/06/19/might-
eurobonds-be-the-answer-to-the-euro-crisis/.
214. HI n IonI s, Tni His-oians 123 (Robin Waterfield trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
215. Id.
216. Id.
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A borrowing sovereign is able to honor its bonds when it has at
least (1) a strong economy, (2) a stable currency and fiscal policy, (3) a
manageable debt, (4) low level of tax evasion, (5) a stable political
leadership, and (6) a positive demographic. 2 17 If points (1), (2), and
(3) can be economically managed, points (4), (5), and (6) have a
profound legal and cultural components that require different solving
skills.2 18
According to some sociologists, crisis prevention is not possible.2 19
During times of crisis, politicians claim that the state has the compe-
tence and ability to manage economic problems accurately. 220 This is
so because the population expects that the state or government will
solve problems because of the traditional Hobbes' principle pro pro-
tection oboedientia:2 2 1 The state protects its citizens provided that they
pay taxes.2 2 Problems arise when the state ceases to protect and the
citizens feel less obligated to obey. 2 23 A shift and possible decay in
cultural values could be the end result.2 24 Some have suggested that
225
economists are not able to predict an economic crisis.
A coordinated solution must tackle these economic, political, legal,
and cultural crises, generating multilevel awareness, methodological
solutions and plans. An economic crisis can be resolved quickly, but
the other crises heal at a different speed.2 2 6 Any solution or plan must
consider this healing time/speed difference. An economic or legal so-
lution takes less time to apply and produce effects than a political or a
cultural one. For example: a legal solution, like a guilty plea or a judi-
cial order, takes a short time to be decided and implemented; a cul-
tural or political change takes more than one generation, such as the
American revolution. A cultural solution may, once introduced, take
more than one generation to show some benefit. Therefore, an effi-
cient economic and legal restructuring may favor the comeback of in-
vestors in the short term, but the cultural and political crises are
capable of disrupting its resolution in the long run and producing a
new economic default.
217. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Tin. Piari ou INiOUAIriy: How TooAY's Divioi i) Soii iv EN-
DAN(i RS ouRi FuTURI 73, 138, 168, 240, (2012).
218. Id.
219. David R. Wenger, Der ohnmachtige Staat: Zwischen Selbsibehauptungsstrategien und
Steuerungsillusionen Bemerkungen anlasslich der Finanzkrise [The Impotent State: Between Self-
Assertion Strategies and Illusions of Control], ANillA luiis (2009) ; See generally Dooley,
supra note 10.
220. Wenger, supra note 230 at 2, 11.
221. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
226. See discussion infra p. 32.
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The lack of a harmonized EU fiscal policy showed the unbalanced
nature of the EU system. The decision to borrow on the foreign mar-
ket pertained not only to Greek authorities but the deficit influenced
the EU institutions, European institutions, and all EU citizens. Politi-
cal instability, corruption, tax evasion and budget deficits influenced
GIIPS's creditworthiness and determined the failure of its repayment
capabilities.
As anticipated at the outset, history showed that the government
capability to repay its obligations is influenced by several factors, not
only economic but political, legal, and socio-cultural in general.2 2 7
However, adding these factors when calculating a country's credit-risk
is complex.
Indeed, due to the EU democratic deficit, the Greek economy re-
flects the isolation of the European institutions and their inability to
influence the Greek economic political leadership and policy determi-
nations.2 2 8 As a matter of fact, EU institutions had to take a cost/
benefit solution in considering whether it was still economically conve-
nient to isolate Greece, or put it in quarantine as the debate devel-
oped,2 2 9 and cut it out it from the bond market.2 3 0
However, the attempt to solve the cultural issues within GIIPS has
never been raised and this is a missed opportunity. European banks
should be aware of the cultural and political obstacles when lending to
member-states, unless they now feel empowered and reinsured by the
restructuring process.
227. Steven A. Block & Paul A. Valeer, The Price of Democracy: Sovereign Risk Ratings,
Bond Spread, and Political Business Cycles in Developing Countries, 23 J INI'I MONI y & FIN.
917, (2004) (discussing the influence of election cycles on market-participants).
228. Times Topics, European Union, NY TIMi s, Oct. 23, 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/organizations/e/european union/index.html.
229. J. Robert Smith, The Issue Come November 2012, Tim AMiiRIAN TiIINKIR (Nov. 4,
2011), http://www.americanthinker.com/2011/11/the-issue-come-november_2012.html See also
Papadimitriou supra note 222.
230. As happened in the past with other defaulting countries like Russia, Ecuador, and Ar-
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